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Abstract This article explores the relationships between female converts to Islam in
Britain and their close friends and family. It pays attention to the perspectives of
converts but focuses on the reactions of their intimates to the conversion. We argue
that converts become ‘intimate strangers’ through conversion—estranged on the level
of understanding and belief but intimate on the emotional plane. This strangeness is
symbolised by the Orientalist stereotypes associated with the converts. At the same
time, friends and family shun engagement with the conversion itself, thus keeping alive
the stereotypes and precluding understanding. In refusing to engage with matters of
belief even within the intimate space of the family, secularism’s orthodox private/public
divide gets busted where religiosity, instead, becomes an issue between the (individual)
private and the (family) public. Lacking reciprocity and with no access to the inner
depths of the people they are closest to, the liberal rhetoric of friends and family about
personal choice and equal acceptance of all paths amounts to bigotry and turns out to be
painful for both the converts and their intimates.
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Becoming intimate strangers
What appeared as most striking during the interviews with converts and their intimates1
was the ‘benign neglect’ encountered on the part of friends and family. While we
encountered hostile remarks on the conversions from intimates as well as considerably
fewer positive comments, the perceptions overall were characterised by a lack of
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interest. Two questions we asked our respondents were: BHave you in any way tried to
engage with [the convert] in order to understand her reasons for converting?^ and
BHave you tried to learn about Islam?^. What we did not expect was that most people
would answer these questions with a straightforward BNo^. A few people explained
how they had tried to engage and only Noura’s friend Dave responded with some sense
of conviction: BOf course I have! What kind of friend would I be if I hadn’t done that?^.
Reading this response may find many people in natural agreement but in fact few
family members thought engagement was called for. What prevailed was a sense of
rejection with the statement BI’m not interested^ being uttered numerous times through-
out the interviews.
This article explores the relationships between female converts to Islam in Britain
and their friends and families. It is based on a mixed method of interviews combined
with participant observation. After an initial contact with three women, the rest of the
participants were recruited through snowballing. We conducted semi-structured inter-
views with nine converts and seven of their friends and family members, including
fathers, mothers and sisters. Sometimes converts spoke about their relatives and how
they had reacted but we did not have the chance to speak to them. In these cases the
findings are taken as presented by the converts. The fieldwork also included spending
time at the homes of converts and their relatives where some of the interaction between
them could be observed and participating in a local Dhikr-circle2 where converts talked
about their experiences with friends and family. Our fieldwork took place in 2013 in
different places across South England and included people from very diverse religious
and ethnic backgrounds. All of the women had converted to Sunni Islam and two
belonged to a Sufi order.
On the one hand, we use the converts’ accounts of their conversion and how these
affected their intimate relationships. On the other hand, we incorporate the perception
of friends and family, how they experienced the conversion and how it changed the way
they relate to the convert. We surmise that through conversion, these women move into
a position of alterity with respect to their closest social network, thus becoming
‘intimate strangers’. 3 Our conjecture is based on the understanding that religious
conversion entails drastic change with respect to both the self and others (Snow and
Machalek 1984). It also draws on the prevalent Orientalist notions of Islam as Europe’s
ultimate ‘Other’ (Said 1978), which have recently been revived in the social sciences
by Huntington’s (1993:39) fervent declaration that the ‘bloody fault lines of Islam’
would become the unbridgeable chasm in the Bclash of civilisations^ between BtheWest
and the rest^. We infer that the resulting Bblock thinking^ (Taylor 2007) has had such
profound impact on people’s ways of conceptualising the world that even in the most
intimate contexts it will become visible.
Although anthropology is concerned with the ‘Other’, anthropologists have—to our
knowledge—not investigated the relationships between converts (to Islam) and their
close social networks. Most studies of conversion across the disciplines have been
2 Dhikr, meaning Bremembrance^, is an Islamic ritual, which involves the recitation or chanting of the names
of God, supplemented by verses from the Qur’an and hadith. It is a form of prayer.
3 We borrow the notion of the ‘intimate stranger’ from the context of divorce. Matthew (1984:19) uses the
term to describe the failure of couples to cater to one another’s Binnermost needs^ thus resulting in divorce.
The lack of understanding between people most intimately linked in a marriage turns them into ‘intimate
strangers’.
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centred on the converts themselves. Topics of investigation have been the reasons for
conversion (Köse and Loewenthal 2000; Köse 1999; Lakhdar et al. 2007; Lofland and
Skonovd 1981; Rambo 1999), the meaning of conversion (Köse 1994; van Nieuwkerk
2008; Wohlrab-Sahr 1999; Woods 2012), conversion and modernisation (Köse 1999;
van Nieuwkerk 2006; Woods 2012; Zebiri 2008), conversion and resistance (Comaroff
and Comaroff 1991; Woods 2012), conversion and the hijab (Tarlo 2007), continuity
and change in conversion (Chua 2012; Robbins 2007) and the negotiation of identity
(Afshar 2008; Sartawi and Sammut 2012; Zebiri 2008). Many of these studies clearly
recognise the social dimensions of conversion and the impact it has on the converts’
immediate social environment. Woods (2012:449), for instance, explains that Bconver-
sion engages with, informs and ultimately disrupts existing notions of meaning and
identity, and impacts individuals, families, communities and the religious groups that
represent old and new affiliation^ and argues that Ba robust conversion discourse should
consider, but also transcend, the changing religion or beliefs of an individual^
(ibid.:441). Zebiri (2008); Moosavi (2011) and Köse (1996) focus on converts to Islam
in Britain. They recognise the social dimension of conversion and the relationships with
friends and family enter their accounts through the eyes of the converts. However, since
relationships are inherently dialogical the picture their studies yield is partial in this
respect. During our investigations we explicitly tried to construct the impact of
conversion on intimate relationships through the perspectives of both converts and
their relations.
Orientalism alive
As has been vividly illustrated by numerous scholars since the publication of Said’s
(1978) Orientalism, the received construction of Islam as Europe’s ‘Other’ harks
back centuries and is still present in modern media discourse and elsewhere (Asad
1993, 2003; Gilliat-Ray 2010; Zebiri 2008, 2011). In the Orientalist perspective
Islam is constructed as a static, monolithic and backward doctrine that both explains
and determines Muslims’ behaviour. It is inherently reductionist in viewing Muslims
almost exclusively through the prism of religion and rests on a dyadic construction,
in which the ‘Orient’ is seen as essentially and, hence, irreconcilably different from
and inferior to the ‘Occident’ (Afshar 2008:412–3; Bullock 2002:xviii; Said
1978:49). 4 The positioning of Islam as the ‘Other’ of a Judeo-Christian Europe
emerged in Rachel’s (59) comment on her sister’s conversion: BIf she had converted
to a religion that wasn’t so counter-opposed to Judaism… if she had converted to be
a Buddhist that’s not so counter-opposed to Judaism, that’s not in conflict with
Judaism.^ When the interviewer pointed out that Judaism had much more in com-
mon with Islam than with Buddhism, she agreed but said that such had been her
perception at the time of conversion 33 years ago.
Even though the discourse about the Muslim world has markedly changed over
time, the themes remained essentially the same throughout. The themes that most
frequently emerge as a marker of difference are the status of Muslim women as sensual
but oppressed and religiously motivated violence both on state and individual levels
4 While Said’s work primarily focuses on Western Orientalist scholarship it also encompasses popular culture
as well as images created in literature and the media (Said 1997).
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(Afshar 2008:414; Bullock 2002:xxxiii; Esposito 2011:xxxii; Zebiri 2011:185). Even
though Orientalist perspectives are by definition directed towards the Muslim/Arab/
Oriental ‘Other’ who is usually thought to be outside of Europe (Asad 2003:171) either
spatially or conceptually (e.g. immigrants), some of this received stereotypical thinking
also became directed towards the converts. Often coming from a white British or
European background, converts were being ‘Orientalised’ by their friends and family
to varying degrees. This is mirrored by an earlier study in which convert women
reported being called ‘White Pakis’ (Suleiman 2013: 37). We perceive this
‘Orientalisation’ to be an important component in making converts into ‘intimate
strangers’.
Women & the hijab: measuring distance
Respondents were usually careful to distinguish between Muslim women in general
and the converts. However, even where some people initially denied any potential
associations of Islam with women’s oppression, they did come through in several
interviews and were ultimately also applied to the converts themselves. The fathers
that were interviewed—and other converts reported the same about their fathers—
perceived women in Islam as Bsecond class citizens^. While some friends and family
emphasised they knew well that their friend or sister was enjoying an equitable
relationship with her husband and acted out of her own will, the fathers interviewed
held on to the view that their daughters had converted to Islam because of their
husbands (see also Brice 2010:18). As Sana’s father (aged 80) put it: BIf she hadn’t
married him she wouldn’t have become a Muslim… there is no reason she should be a
Muslim otherwise^. Inherent in this perception is a notion of the woman’s dependency
on the man and the idea that her actions are not really of her own choosing but that she
acted because of and ultimately for her husband. The reverse idea, that a woman’s
inclination to Islam may in fact have led her to marry a Muslim man, was absent from
their discourse. The comment links up with Moosavi’s (2011:263–4) elaboration on the
BIslamophobic prejudice^, which plays out in the form of dismissing the conversion or
attributing it to Bother reasons^. In Moosavi’s as well as our findings, the idea that the
converts had turned to Islam for their husbands was particularly obstinate and resistant
to correction even though the converts had repeatedly tried to explain that even without
their husbands they would still be Muslim and that—if they were ever to get di-
vorced—they would still keep the faith. As one participant in Suleiman’s (2013: 39)
study put it: ‘ditch the man but keep the Islam’. The bottom-line of such ‘explanations’
is that Islam in itself does not seem to offer anything of value so that other reasons for
conversion have to be found.
The hijab as an emergent theme in our interviews is intimately linked with the status
of women in Islam as part of the Orientalist picture. Many women spoke highly of the
hijab, calling it a Bmirror of identity^ or said that they felt Bvery comfortable^ and Bat
home^ in it. Some emphasised how the hijab had served as a signal to other Muslims
and how they had gotten to know new people by wearing it (see also Tarlo 2007:151).
All of the women who wore or had worn the hijab attached great importance to it and
almost unanimously reported that it served as a form of Bprotection from unwanted
looks^, Ba shield against chauvinism^, a Bnice filter^ or a protection against Bsmut^. As
a seeming paradox, several women had encountered disadvantage, harassment or even
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violent assault (losing their job, being spat at, being insulted, having a stone thrown at
them and being stared at) because they wore the hijab and yet, they all agreed that it
protected them (Tarlo 2007:143; van Nieuwkerk 2008:443). Primarily, it became clear,
it protected them against the Bmale gaze^, which apparently and counter-intuitively was
perceived as a greater threat than verbal or physical abuse attracted through the hijab.
Even though most converts saw the hijab primarily as a religious requirement, they
all acknowledged the positive effect it had on their evading the male gaze. Many spoke
of the increased respect with which they were now being treated—especially by men—
with seats being offered in the tube, excuses being extended for bad language in their
presence and a general upgrade in perception (see also Tarlo 2007:142). They all
resented the objectification of women in British society, the sexualisation of the female
body in advertisements and on billboards and the impact these had on how women
were seen and treated. Jane (31) reflected:
BI was looking around me thinking: women are becoming more and more
objectified… to sell a car you’re spreading a naked woman across it… I’m not
gonna be part of that… I’m wearing a headscarf and I’m making a statement
about, you know, judge me by my brains, not my looks, so I was almost cutting
off chauvinism […] if you are going to objectify my body then I’m just gonna
completely hide it from you… So, it was actually a feminist statement^.
Jane’s sentiments mirror both Tarlo’s and Werbner’s discussion of the hijab. To
Werbner (2012:116) it functions like Ba protective shield against the male gaze^ in
preventing unwanted advances while Tarlo (2007:143) describes it as allowing women
to be seen as Ba human being rather than as a sexual commodity .^ The hijab, converts
explained, helped them to be perceived Bas a person^, rather than a female body, and
judged based on their inner values, rather than their Blooks^. As such the hijab
represented a means of empowerment for many of the women (see also Asad
2003:79; Brenner 1996:674; Lee 2010:153; van Nieuwkerk 2008:434; Zebiri
2008:208).
Concerning the hijab, there was an enormous disconnect between the converts’
perceptions and how friends and family looked at it. To many relatives the hijab was a
nuisance. It seems warranted that Zebiri (2011:181) calls the hijab Bthe most powerful
symbol of Muslims’ otherness^, signalling women’s subjugation. In Zebiri’s study
many converts reported that their families had accepted their conversion until they
put on the hijab, which caused hesitation for many converts in the decision to start
wearing it (van Nieuwkerk 2008:444). It is in this vein that Scott (2007:124) suggests
the Bveil^ represents a Bconspicuous display of religious affiliation^, which seems to be
unwelcome in the modern secular society. While some people had voiced their
neutrality towards the scarf, only Maryam’s older sister Judith (63) had actually
commented positively on the way it looked but most people disliked it. Whereas some
chose to call it outright Bsilly^ or Bridiculous^, others said it was Ba pity^ and even
Bunnatural^. Köse (1996:138) also refers to one convert telling him her father thought
she had Btaken a step back to the Middle Ages^ when she started wearing the hijab, thus
making explicit the linking of the hijab with backwardness (Afshar 2008:419).
The reasons for dismissing the hijab varied slightly. While some stressed that it
could cause trouble in form of harassment for the convert, others made clear that the
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visibility of religion was bothersome to them. Sana’s father explained: BIt’s up to her
but it’s a pity because it means in this country she stands out as being… erm a
Muslim… which is a minority. A lot of people feel animosity towards Muslims^.
However, at other points and unrelated to the hostility that the hijab would expose Sana
to, her father emotively exclaimed: BI think it’s a pity that she [wears] it and I can’t see
any point in doing it either… I don’t like it^. BMore and more^, he said, he came to
think that Islam was a Bridiculous religion^.
Both Christine’s and Noura’s fathers expressed similar judgements (Bsilly ,^ Bridic-
ulous^) but apparently for slightly different reasons. While Christine’s father (61)
expressed his concern about his daughter’s becoming a victim of Islamophobia, and
disliking the scarf in itself, he also explained: BI didn’t want her to settle down or get
involved with somebody before she went to [university]… I wanted her to be single so
she could meet lots of different people… I was disappointed… she wouldn’t go
anywhere socially for drinking now .^ In this statement the father expresses his resent-
ment about his daughter converting to Islam, getting married at the same time and
adopting a ‘settled’ lifestyle, which would no longer allow her to go out in the same
way that most undergraduate students would, experimenting with drinks and dates.
Hidden beneath this sense of ‘loss’ seems to lie the perception that his daughter would
not be able to fully live out her freedom while adhering to Islam. Ironically, it is the
visibility of the hijab that the women embrace as a means for their own invisibility.
Their outer appearance, their female body, becomes invisible to the male gaze, which in
turn induces a boost in respect and a focus on the women’s personality. At the same
time it is precisely the visibility of the hijab that turns out to be so bothersome to the
male family members in particular. Tarlo (2007:132) succinctly discusses the double-
significance of the hijab as concealing the female body on the one hand and signalling
visibility Bas Muslim^ on the other, often attracting ‘kindred spirits’ and evoking
respect. It is striking that the converts’ narratives converged with more consistency
on this topic than on any other, which testifies to the iconicity of the hijab. As the
hijab has become iconic of ‘Muslimness’ and Islam as a backward faith that
oppresses women, converts tried to counter that iconic symbolism through their
narratives.
Violent stereotyping
Like the status of women, violence has been an intrinsic feature of Orientalist
scholarship from its inception. The notion of the Bbloodthirsty^ Muslim and the
idea that Islam was Bspread by the sword^ were default assumptions beginning with
the Crusades (Gilliat-Ray 2010:6). While at various points in history, such as the
expansion of Al-Andalus or the spread of the Ottoman Empire, it was the
encroaching Muslim armies that threatened various places in Europe, recent percep-
tions of violent Islam came in association with jihadist extremism and terrorism both
inside and outside the ‘West’ (Zebiri 2011:175). Even though none of the respon-
dents associated Muslim violence directly with the converts, the topic of terrorism
and ‘Islamic’ violence curiously appeared in sometimes completely unrelated con-
texts and came to negatively influence perceptions. The association of Islam with
violence as antithetical to a democratic Britain observant of human rights contrib-
uted to the converts’ positioning as ‘intimate strangers’.
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When Christine (20) was explaining the central tenets of Islam to her parents and
elaborated that scholarly disagreements prevailed in Islamic law concerning many
minor issues but that the central questions appertaining to the faith’s content were
agreed upon, her father suddenly interrupted asking: BWell, in that case then, what’s
the problem in Syria… where Muslims are killing Muslims?^. This seemingly
misplaced question highlights two things. One is the inherited Orientalist epistemol-
ogy, according to which Muslims’ actions are being deduced from and reduced to
Islam; the fact that the Syrian conflict is first and foremost a political conflict is
completely sidestepped in order to view it through Islamic spectacles. The other
noteworthy facet of the question is that it apparently seems relevant and therefore
warranted to bring up violent conflict while discussing Islamic theology. One
wonders why the question would be deemed fit if it was not for the perception that
violence is an inherent component of Islamic doctrine.
In a different context, Sana’s father asserted that Muslims go on Bsuicide missions^
by blowing themselves up. What is interesting about this perception of Islam—besides
the same reductionist shortcomings of the previous example—is that his daughter had
explained several times that such violence is neither prescribed nor in any way
sanctioned by the Qur’an or Islamic doctrine. Sana’s explanations only prompted him
to say: BI can’t believe it [her explanations]… it’s got to be somewhere [in Islam],
right?^. While unwilling to actually read the Qur’an or try to find evidence for his
assumptions, he chose to hold on to the received view and accept the image promoted
in the media over the elaborations made by Muslims themselves. Reading the Qur’an
is, of course, not in itself a remedy to either understand Islam or bridge the apparent
intimacy issues. However, taking up the Qur’an and reading it signals a willingness to
understand and a proactive step to engaging with the convert. What matters is not
whether someone who takes up the Qur’an understands it or not, but the symbolic
meaning of this action. Seeing their intimates reading the Qur’an symbolically signals
to the converts a willingness to engage on part of their family members. In Orientalism
Reconsidered Said (1985:97) re-emphasises the point already made in his foundational
book that this refusal to accept Muslim self-representation is symptomatic of Orientalist
thinking. It is the result of the superiority complex so deeply engrained in the
Orientalist tradition that the Oriental subject about whom statements are being made
has no credibility when confronted with the authoritative stance of the enlightened
Western interlocutor. In the Orientalist tradition Muslims are seen as incapable of
accurately representing themselves and therefore need to be represented by those
who are more knowledgeable about Islam than they are. The outsider (here the media)
is seen as being a better source of knowledge about Islam than the insider.
In the context of discussing both religiously motivated violence and the hijab,
received images from the media seem to have led this father to a rejection of his
daughter’s conversion after he had initially accommodated it: BAt first it didn’t bother
me, I think. Later on it did^. He articulated his feeling Bunhappy^ with the religion and
coming to think Bmore and more^ that it was Ba pity that she converted^. In statements
like these a clear change of heart becomes visible. Instead of going from an initial shock
to slowly accommodating and accepting the conversion, Sana’s father—and this is in
line with what Malika reported of her father—started off with an attitude of indifference
that later developed into outright rejection. Both women concerned are amongst the
‘older’ converts. Having converted in the late 70s and early 80s respectively they had
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received little to no reaction from their fathers at the time of conversion. Even though
Malika’s father, being an outspoken atheist, had voiced his disdain for Banother nutcase
in the family^ (Malika’s mother being a devout catholic), he had actually also voiced
some relief at her settling down and finding her path in life.
At the time of conversion, Sana’s parents said that they knew Bof^ Islam but that they
Bdidn’t know anything about it^. It was a blank page. Malika articulated that she
blamed the increasingly anti-Muslim media discourse, in particular post-9/11, for her
father’s hostile attitude. She mentioned that he watches a lot of TV and frequently
confronts her with newspaper articles concerning terrorism and Islamic extremism.
From not being Bbothered^ by their daughters’ conversions these two fathers experi-
enced a surge in hostility and rejection. It seemed that their change coincided with a
shift in the national imaginary of Islam. Even though they did not directly associate
their convert daughters with a violent image of Islam, the received Orientalist trajectory,
which has been perpetuated with increased intensity after 9/11 in the media, did turn out
to influence them in their perceptions of the conversion and caused them to reject it
retrospectively. During the interviews it appeared both in direct conversation with
parents and in what converts said about their parents that fathers seemed to struggle
a lot more with accepting the conversion than mothers did. It is not possible to draw
any conclusions as to why this is so based on the data collected. However, we put
forward two conjectures, both of which would lend themselves to further research. On
the one hand paternalistic structures or the remnants thereof might make a felt ‘loss of
control’ over the daughter’s path in life more painful for fathers. This resurfacing of the
father as the ‘head of the household’ would question the notion that paternalistic family
structures have been replaced with more egalitarian ones in a contemporary British
context. On the other hand, it seemed that fathers relate to their daughters more via
common interests and themes with which they can identify. As they no longer share the
same opinions on many issues post-conversion fathers seemed to see less of a common
ground with their child. Mothers appeared as less interested in discussing and arguing
over news stories, technicalities and themes of common interest, and emphasised
instead their unconditional love for and interest in the convert. Rather than perceiving
the conversion as an affront against their worldview, mothers seemed to suffer more
from the perceived lack or break of trust.
Selective knowledge
What became clear during the interviews was that many of the friends and family
members had very selective knowledge about Islam and about Muslims, sometimes
even after long periods of having a Muslim family member. Sana’s father expressed his
disapproval of the fact that Bthey are allowed to take more than one wife if they can
afford it^. Upon questioning whether he had ever tried to find out about such provisions
or whether he had asked his daughter about it he said that he had, in fact, never
enquired about any of it, that he was not interested and that—although his daughter had
given him a copy of the Qur’an—he had never even looked at it. Christine’s parents
pointed to the fact that women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive cars, said that
there were Btoo many rules^ in Islam, thought that other religions were much more
Btolerant^, felt mystified by the many Bthreats^ [of hell] in the Qur’an and expressed the
view that Islam was a Bmean religion^ for the apparent lack of gifts during birthday
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celebrations. Similar to the attitude presented by Sana’s father, these parents did not
really try to understand or seek an explanation for what they were criticising. Instead,
they seemed to be building an ‘argument-proof vest’ in order to protect the prejudices at
hand.When Christine pointed out that Judaism, too, entails a large set of rules, her father
only commented: BYes, but there are very few Jews who follow .^ Reminded that
Christianity also entails Bthreats^ regarding the menacing prospect of hell, he did not
feel as threatened by these.
Concerning the Saudi prohibition on women driving it is worth pointing out that
Saudi Arabia is, in fact, the only Muslim country in the world, which has such a law.
Following inductive logic it seems strange that somebody would look at a statistical
exception and make it into a general rule. This form of selective induction seems to hint
at underlying assumptions about Islam, which make this exception into a relevant case.
Even though statistically an exception, it somehow comes to reflect the true nature of
Islam. Malika’s report of her father’s accusations concerning BIslamic terrorism^ mirror
a similar pattern. Whenever she tried to explain that the terror is neither prescribed nor
sanctioned by Islam, her father would reply that she was not following the Breal Islam^
but instead, belonged to some fringe group, which had misunderstood its true meaning.
Islam’s Breal^ meaning in that case was being deduced from selective media reports
about Muslim violence and the oppression of women. The disbelief regarding the
converts’ explanations ran through several of the interviews indicating that the con-
vert’s opinion was not taken seriously. Paradoxically, at times, some family members
would expect the converts to explain violent events, thus treating them as representa-
tives of Islam. This demand in and of itself is part of the monolithic Orientalist
paradigm, reducing Muslims’ actions to Islam (Zebiri 2011:184) and treating any
Muslim as a representative of the entire religion (Tarlo 2007:146). Dissatisfied with
the answer, they would subsequently go on to denounce the convert—the living and
tangible example refuting their claims—as belonging to a fringe group, which failed to
represent mainstream Islam, and hence was not to be taken seriously. This too, is
emblematic of the Orientalist stance. As in Jauss’ Reception Theory (Jauss 1982: 23),
where a literary work (even if new) does not appear in an informational vacuum ‘but
predisposes its audience to a very specific kind of reception’ it appeared that our
interlocutors assimilated what was presented to them to their previously formed
schemata. Information given by the converts was modified to match the pre-existing
horizons of expectation.
Another explanation to these seemingly paradoxical expectations might be offered
by Marianne Gullestad’s concept of Bnegative hypervisibility .^ In Plausible Prejudice
Gullestad (2006: 50–7) explores how Norwegian media outlets are consistently exam-
ining the oppression of immigrant women (mainly of Pakistani origin) through such
themes as forced marriage, female circumcision, honour killings, and male violence
towards their wives and children. In this discourse newspapers give a voice to specific
Bsuperprivileged^ minority women who come of an immigrant background and pub-
licly talk about their plight and their struggle against patriarchal traditions. While
celebrating these highly visible, superprivileged voices, the media disregards the points
of view of most minority people who are rendered voiceless in what Gullestad calls
Bnegative hypervisibility .^ They are highly visible in the media’s reports on their
oppression and aggression yet muted, as they do not get the chance to explain their
actions. In combining the positive visibility of a few superprivileged minority ‘stars’
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with the negative hypervisibility and voicelessness of the minority’s majority, the
minority background itself becomes simultaneously very important and not important
at all. In their struggle to represent themselves and Islam in a way that they would like
to be seen, converts experience something reminiscent of Gullestad’s Bnegative
hypervisibility .^ While their minority status (Muslim) is the very reason Islam is made
the subject of discussion with family members, this same minority status does not seem
to give them authority to speak of Islam.
The selective knowledge brought up during the interviews is worth mentioning not
because these prejudices are all untrue (though some of them certainly are) but because
they are indicative of the associations that friends and family have when they think of
Islam, and hence, of their tinted perceptions. The stereotypical thinking and ensuing
‘folk’ ideologies about Islam where cases like the Saudi legislation on women driving
features prominently are naturalised in a way that make them hard to be questioned.
The ‘protective belt’ that people build around their assumptions are indicative of the
hegemonic status that these folk ideologies have, which moves them outside the
Buniverse of discourse^ and into Bourdieu’s (1977:168–9) doxic Buniverse of the
undisputed^. As naturalisms, certain ‘truths’ are not up for discussion. In the post-
modern sense of Bideology^ we do not refer to political grand schemes or specific
paradigms intended to contest or promote certain interests in society. Rather, ideology
in this context refers to certain ‘systems of meaning’ (Geertz 1973:196). Like
Foucault’s (1976: 93–5) revolutionary conception of power as a subtle, omnipresent,
systemic, and productive mechanism, rather than the authoritative and oppressive top-
down binary envisioned hitherto, so ideology too is here meant as something Bevery-
day ,^ which is present not only in the political sphere but also in the private sphere of
the family. In Bourdieu’ discussion of ideology he conceptualises the world of ideas as
split into two: the universe of discourse, in which ideas are being discussed and
orthodoxies negotiated; and the universe of doxa, the realm of that which is not
discussed. Doxa are taken for granted, they are accepted givens or Btruths^, which
are juxtaposed to the field of opinion, the site of confrontation between competing
discourses (Bourdieu 1977:168). Doxa thus have hegemonic status, they are axioms
whose truth cannot be called into question (Gramsci 1998:210–71). During the inter-
views it appeared that critical awareness of Islam and its horizons was closing in;
certain assumptions about Islam as misogynist, oppressive, backward and aggressive
enjoyed such an axiomatic status.
Neglecting intimates
As mentioned earlier, the most striking response to conversion was what we have called
‘benign neglect’. Besides a general lack of interest the parents in particular emphasised
‘choice’ and adopted a seemingly liberal attitude. Being asked what they thought of
their daughter’s conversion, Sana’s parents agreed that BIt’s her choice^ while
Christine’s parents explained: BWe just want her to be happy […] she could be
whatever she wanted to be^. Delving a bit deeper into the conversations many of these
seemingly liberal statements change character. While most people presented themselves
as accepting of pluralism, several statements hint towards an attitude which could be
more accurately described as mere liberal rhetoric or bigotry (see Rabinowitz 1997). As
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Abu-Lughod (2002:789) and others have pointed out, respect requires engagement.
With the lack of engagement we found, it is hardly surprising that ultimately the
reception offered by friends and family make acceptance a Bfact of life^ (Farrar et al.
2012:1) more than acceptance by way of respect or embrace.
The reason why the statements emphasising the choice and happiness of the convert
are more accurately described as superficially or merely rhetorically liberal is that
oftentimes they were supplemented by utterances of dislike and outright rejection,
which brought to light deeper-seated assumptions. While stressing conversion being
Sana’s choice, which he Baccepted^, statements by her father to the effect that BI am
anti-religion, full stop^ and the assertions that Islam was Ba ridiculous religion^
certainly did not allow for a neutral perception of her conversion as initially articulated.
Similarly, Christine’s father emphasising BI find it ridiculous! I accept it… I still think
it’s ridiculous^ points to his rejection camouflaged as acceptance. While he clearly
wants to be liberal and accepting of his daughter’s choices, he does not actually
welcome them. It is hard to believe that Bshe could be whatever she wanted to be^
when really her choice was Bridiculous^. Judging her new faith as Bridiculous^ comes
with an entire universe of assumptions, some of which have been elaborated above,
which does not allow the conversion to be perceived in a benignly accepting manner.
The rejectionism is emblematised in the superficial acceptance of any path and a
simultaneous deep-seated rejection of Islam and some of the changes it brings to the
converts’ lives. While the hijab and the five daily prayers were mentioned several times
as instances of annoyance, Sana’s father also expressed his irritation at the adjustments
being made for the provision of halal food: BEverything had to change because of it^.
Making clear that he would not respect these rules, he added with a mildly reproachful
nod in the direction of his wife Bbut Marianne [his wife] won’t cheat^. It is in the
interstices of the liberal rhetoric that the prejudiced perceptions of conversion come to
light. In a way, the relativistic withdrawal from the issue (BIt’s her choice^ but BI’m not
interested^) amounts to a protection of the self from meaningful engagement and the
effects this could have.
While describing her path to conversion Christine explained how learning about
Islam had caused her to question various aspects of British society, ranging from
the treatment of women and consumerism to the complete absence of spirituality
in many people’s lives. This mirrors Tarlo’s (2007:149) assertion that the presence
of Islam in the public space (in the form of dress) provoked Bnew thoughts and
feelings^ and Köse’s (1999:309) and Lee’s (2010:150) conjectures that Islam is
frequently used to question and protest modern trends such as ‘hypersexuality’
and consumerism. During the conversations it often seemed that it was precisely
this kind of critical engagement that many respondents were seeking to avoid. The
reason why ‘refusal to engage’ is actually a more accurate labelling of the seeming
‘indifference’, is because the numerous negative comments and assumptions
discussed earlier indicate that the superficial neglect is, in fact, not so indifferent.
Being bothered by the prayers, halal food or the hijab signal dislike, rather than
neutral indifference. Symptomatic of the refusal to engage were the outright
rejections to do so in the form of BI’ve never asked^, Bwe don’t talk about it^
and BI’m just not interested^. Neglect is not indifference; it is wilful. Wanting to
know, on the other hand, is turning something into a legitimate subject, and
ultimately means acknowledgement.
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A focus on the exterior aspects of Islam, such as food, with a certain sense of
nostalgia for having lost these common external denominators (BHer favourite things
for Christmas dinner were sausages wrapped in bacon^) further served as evidence that
a meaningful discussion of the inner aspects of Islam—the ones that were prioritised by
the converts—was being evaded. Consequently, converts and relatives are communi-
cating on two different levels with no shared understanding. While the level of
engagement offered by friends and family was on the intellectual and exterior plane,
for the converts it was the spiritual dimension of their new religion, which asked for
engagement but was not being understood by the majority of their intimates, resulting
in a loss of closeness. Rachel was the only respondent who reflected on her own stance
towards spirituality and conceded: BIf I’m really truthful I think I’m a bit dismissive…
it just doesn’t turn me on^. Then she laughed. Turning serious again she reminisced
with a saddened undertone BI wanted to dismiss it, I think… I couldn’t really, deep
down, accept it and I didn’t want to engage with it^.
What is problematic about the disengagement on the part of friends and family is
that converts often feel profoundly misunderstood while relatives express their
mystification. This does not seem unique to British converts as Hofmann (1997) and
Anway (2008) report similar sentiments among converts in Germany and the United
States. Hofmann explains that some converts had accused their intimates of not
listening and not understanding. As a result, access to the converts’ interior, to their
inner life, is barred to those who would be expected to be part of it. Consequently,
Hofmann (1997:168–83) writes, family frequently gets substituted by like-minded
friends, often converts themselves. During my interviews several friends and family
members unhappily commented on the converts’ tendency to turn away from them in
search for understanding elsewhere.
Secularism & modernity
The perceptions of conversion as outlined so far cannot be understood in isolation of
the social space that frames them. Understanding this social space, against which the
Orientalist perception of the converts is constructed on the one hand and which allows
intimates the refusal of engagement on the other hand, requires a look at its basic
axioms. We will discuss notions of modernity and secularism, which seem to provide
the basis for friends and family to form their perceptions.
Several converts reported that after their conversion they had been treated, in one
way or another, as intellectually inferior, irrational or anti-modern. Ayshe (43) had
encountered questions such as Bwhat happened to your intelligence?^ by several of her
family members. In the context of talking about religion more generally, Dave called
his friend’s newfound religiosity in Islam Bout-dated^ and Ba thing of the past^. While
Orientalism in its classic form as analysed by Said (1978) constructs the Orient as
antithetical to Europe in terms of religion where Islam is seen as Christianity’s heretical
‘Other’, this is no longer of primary relevance (Asad 1993; Gilliat-Ray 2010). Instead,
the West is now presented as inherently modern and secular with any sign of religiosity
being perceived as backward and out-dated (Mahmood 2005:113).
Modernity is presented as rational, mature and secular, opposed to which stand the
religious, irrational and backward (Köse 1996:138; Zebiri 2011:187). Yet, within the
general anti-religious attitude of modernity a hierarchy seems to exist, in which Islam
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occupies the lowest rank. Johns and Saeed (2002:209) testify to this notion when they
write in the Australian context: BThere is a pecking order in the popular assessment of
religions in Australia. Buddhism is intellectually chic […] Islam, on the other hand, is
widely viewed through stereotypical lenses, and conversion to Islam (as opposed to
Buddhism, for example) is regarded as an aberration^. This perception came through in
Rachel’s explanation concerning her sister Maryam: BShe went to Mecca, she went on
the Hajj a few years ago and I think, because I’m not spiritual… actually, I think it’s all
a bit nutty .^ When discussing the fact that other religions also undertake pilgrimages,
such as the Christian pilgrimage to Lourdes, she agreed that it was not unique to Islam
but, after all, she thought that the Christian pilgrimages were Bnot quite as mad^.
To Asad (2003:15) secularism is centrally located inside modernity. Secularisation
theory predicted that with increasing modernisation, religion would lose prominence
both in society at large and in the minds of individuals (Berger 1999:1–9; Köse
1999:302). Secularism featured strongly in the conversations with most of the relatives
thinking of religion as a matter of personal choice that should be reserved for the
private sphere. Relegated to the private, people were then welcome to believe whatever
they wanted to believe: BWhatever works for you^ (Dave, 33). As Fox (2004:356) has
observantly pointed out: BWe [the English] are not only indifferent but […] we are
politely indifferent, tolerantly indifferent, benignly indifferent […] Other people are
very welcome to worship Him [God] if they choose—it’s a free country—but this is a
private matter, and they should keep it to themselves^. Slightly further down the line,
she elaborates humorously: BOur benign indifference remains benign only so long as
the religious of any persuasion, stay in their place and refrain from discomforting the
non-practicing, spiritually neutral majority with embarrassing or tedious displays of
religious zeal^ (ibid.:357). The question arises: what does staying in one’s place mean?
The orthodox interpretation of secularism is premised on the private/public divide,
building on the idea that religion could be practiced privately but should not have a
place in public (Asad 2003:8; Modood 2007:72; Taylor 1994:62).
What our research reveals is a form of secularism that goes beyond the orthodox
interpretation and busts the private/public dichotomy. Since we are already dealing with
families—a realm traditionally thought of as the epitome of privacy—the question is
where the public comes in. It does not. It seems that the problem at hand is not that the
converts had carried their religiosity into the public, but rather, that they had revealed
their personal (individual) private sphere to the private sphere of the family; it had
become ‘public’ to the family. Noticing the five daily prayers, halal food or the hijab in
the private family sphere was thought to be sufficiently overt so as not to engage with
it. Besides the societal dimension of neighbours and others noticing that there was now
a Muslim in the family, it was the perceived ‘interference’ with family privacy that felt
like a non-secular affront. In effect, secularism meant that religion had become so
private that it was not to leave the individual person. As a result, conversations within
the family never penetrated into questions of belief. Even though the converts regarded
Islam as most important, intimates showed little interest in learning about their beliefs.
Several respondents actually pointed out that they never had any conversations about
matters of belief with their friends and family and Judith described her family’s
conversations as Bfunctional^.
The resulting dilemma unfolds as follows: even though religiosity is certainly a
matter of inner faith, it is also inherently social and shared. However, the closest
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environment to a very large degree declines any engagement with the converts’
religiosity. As pointed out in Abu-Lughod’s (2002:787) critique of cultural relativism,
respect for diversity requires self-reflection and engagement. Without engagement there
is no chance for understanding and respect to grow. How important understanding is in
truly accepting the converts’ choices is indicated by Jane in her account of how her
mother’s initial rejection changed: BNow, 13 years later things have changed a lot and
my mother really embraces my Islam now… but that’s because she understands it now.
She doesn’t see it as so different from Christianity now .^ In this case the mother could
relate to her daughter through a shared understanding of spirituality even though they
chose to follow different religious paths. The key to this shared understanding and the
ensuing embrace and respect was only possible due to an active engagement with each
other’s beliefs (Hall 1990:227; Ramadan 2012:31; Taylor 1994:72). This kind of open
communication about matters of faith enabled the mother to recognise elements of her
own belief system, which helped to reduce distance and discover the similarities that
were shared between the two different paradigms.
Families unwound
Even though most family members expressed no interest in the content of Islam or the
converts’ reasons for converting, the choice that these women made in converting did
affect family relationships deeply. This was true both for religious and non-religious
families.
Christine’s parents explained that they were Bshocked^ when their daughter first told
them about her conversion and that Bit just felt wrong^. Her mother in particular
resented the perceived lack of trust, which had kept her daughter from telling her any
earlier about it: B[She’s] always told us everything and she just didn’t tell us this^.5
Despite the fact that there was such a degree of indifference towards religion in general,
conversion shook up the taken-for-granted order. It almost seemed that as long as
everybody tacitly agreed on a shared framework of norms and values, there needed to
be no discussion about it. However, the moment there was a change in one of the family
members away from the received paradigm, it felt Bwrong^ to the rest of the family and
had a deeply upsetting impact. Consequently, acceptance did not emerge as the result of
engagement with the disturbing news but was ‘forced’ onto those parents who did not
want to lose the relationship with their daughter. In several interviews family members
expressed the understanding that they would have lost their convert sister/daughter, had
they not accepted it: BI didn’t want to lose my daughter, so I accepted it^.
This statement echoes what both Rachel and Judith said about their parents who
were deeply hurt by the conversion. BIt was quite painful for everyone^, Rachel
recalled, BI was very confused and upset … I was cross really that she had done
something so challenging to the family… Personally I felt very challenged by that and
also for my parents that she challenged them so much and they rose to the occasion and
supported her but I knew it was very, very hard for them^. In agreement with her
sister’s statements, Judith recalled that her parents were Bhugely, deeply hurt but also
very generous^. She also remembered—being on a spiritual search herself—feeling
5 In a separate interview Christine confided that she had kept her conversion to herself in order Bnot to be
swayed^ by her family.
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quite attracted to the prospect of joining her sister in the Sufi order but did not dare to
do so because her parents reminded her: B[Maryam] hurt us so much already… we
couldn’t bear it if you were to go^.
Both sisters agreed that the parents felt abandoned and rejected when Maryam
decided to leave Judaism for Islam. Maryam herself recognises in hindsight that her
family must have felt somewhat rejected by her conversion, asking themselves BWhat’s
wrong with Judaism?^. Therefore it is not only the converts who experience a feeling of
being rejected but also their families. They experience the conversion as a de facto
rejection of their value system, their lifestyle and ultimately themselves. Judith reported
a real sense of loss at her sister’s conversion and pointed out that her father’s friends
would have sat shiva6 for their daughter but that her parents refrained from doing that.
The sense of a death-like loss articulated by Judith is also reported in Köse’s (1996:137)
study on converts where he refers to this phenomenon as Bsocial death^. Reflecting on
the pain that Maryam’s conversion had caused the family, Rachel tried to make sense of
it in hindsight: BI suppose these feelings within a family are irrational, you know?
When you say to me ‘rationally, why were you so upset?’—well, it’s because it’s a
family and these feelings are very deep, even though we are very different people with
different interests^. What these reflections show is that family ties are predicated on a
shared understanding—even if tacit—concerning the ‘universe of discourse’ (Snow
and Machalek 1984). Where this understanding is disrupted by one family member
opting out of the paradigm, feelings of loss, anger and pain can ensue. Although
intimate as family members, an element of strangeness was introduced into the
relationship causing the converts to become ‘intimate strangers’.
Looking ahead
When Judith was asked whether she thought of England as a Christian country, she
answered, BNo, it’s a multicultural society, I would say .^ While dropping me7 off at the
train station later, she wanted to know what I had found most striking during my
research. I told her that it had been the perceived neglect on the part of friends and
family. She nodded Byes, many people never think about the outsider .^ Looking at her
thoughtful expression, I asked Bdo you see yourself as an outsider?^ Without hesitation
or bitterness but an unmistakable sternness in her voice she answered nodding: BAs a
Jew, you’re concerned with the outsider all your life^.
The apparent contradiction between Judith’s perception of Britain as a multicultural
society and her feeling like an outsider is symptomatic for the social space we have
been describing. Yes, people coexist in England with a certain degree of tolerance but it
is not truly multicultural in the sense that different backgrounds are equally appreciated.
A hierarchy remains in place, rendering some people outsiders. Sen (2006:3) invoked
an illustrative image to characterise the current state of British multiculturalism by
asking BDoes the existence of a diversity of cultures, which might pass one another like
6 Sitting shiva refers to the weeklong mourning period in Judaism for first-degree relatives that have passed
away. It usually begins following burial. In the context of conversion it signals that the convert has ‘died’ to
the family.
7 All interviews were conducted by D. Ramahi.
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ships in the night, count as a successful case of multiculturalism?^. The image is clear:
people coexist (in the literal sense of the word) but are disconnected from one another.
In place of Fox’s (2004:356) Bpolite indifference^, we found neglect. And instead of
mutual acknowledgement, families experienced feelings of loss, betrayal and pain.
The question arises what an appropriate and constructive alternative to the encoun-
tered neglect could be. From different disciplines including philosophy, literary criti-
cism and anthropology scholars have formulated responses. Where Taylor (1994)
speaks of Brecognition^ Bhabha (1990) and Hall (1990) have articulated theories of
Bcultural difference^ and Bhybridity^ in the Bthird space^. On the anthropological end,
Asad (2003:179) has employed notions of Bcomplex space^ and Bheterogeneous time^
that go beyond constructions of multiple identities to actually allowing for Bmultiple
ways of life^. What all of these approaches share is their fundamental premise in the
willingness to actively engage with the ‘Other’.
We set out with the assumption that by converting to Islam the women we spoke
with would in one way or another be ‘othered’ by the people who are closest to them.
The fieldwork has revealed that this is true, but in a peculiar way. Most respondents
made clear that their emotional and filial ties had not been adversely affected by the
conversion and that the convert was still the same person to them. In that sense,
intimacy prevailed. Strangeness was introduced into the relationship on the level of
spirituality. Islam’s visibility became a measure of distance between the converts and
their intimates. Friends and family expressed having no understanding for the
conversion but often felt challenged or angered by it. Our hunch is that despite
much bias against Islam, the disruption of complex family dynamics brought about
by conversion to Islam would be experienced in a similar way in cases of conversion
to other religions.
Our findings give rise to an array of unanswered questions, which extend well
beyond the scope of our research but which give direction to important future inves-
tigations. At the core lies the question of why it is that relatives in particular chose to
benignly neglect the conversion. We take a cue from Tarlo (2007:139) in speculating
that the refusal stems from the fear Bnot so much of the encounter or interaction but of
the transformation that such interaction might engender .^ It seemed like a form of self-
protection, shielding people from self-reflection and not calling into question their
existing worldviews. As Christine had experienced the transformative power of her
engagement with Islam, friends and family usually wanted to avoid precisely such
critical engagement in order not to look at the self.
A further point of departure for future research is the notion of the ‘intimate
stranger’. While we have taken the ‘intimate stranger’ to characterise the relationships
between converts and their intimates, a more conceptual extension of the notion is
possible. The media ‘artefacts’ need to be analysed as both intimate and far. How is it
possible that the discursive idioms about Islam still live in the space of the home despite
our contact with Muslim friends and family members? It seems that these media
‘artefacts’ serve as vehicles that propel into the intimate sphere very distant images
that come into conflict with our personal relations and dominate them. Indeed, it feels
like these ‘artefacts’ invade the intimate space. Why do these media images seem to
have a greater impact than the people we are closest to? And finally we would like to
take up our observations about the fathers’ struggle to accept their daughters’ conver-
sions in order to ask whether this calls for a re-assessment of patriarchy in European
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societies. Is it possible that conversion to Islam taps into deeply embedded forms of
paternalism that seem to have been in retreat in other areas of social life?
If it is not possible to extend genuine recognition to the people we love, then what
are the prospects of recognising and appreciating strangers? Genuine recognition comes
with a risk: the risk of being transformed. The engagement between converts and their
relations was incomplete in the sense that friends and family did not want to give room
to the possibility that they themselves may change through it. Instead, the observed
disengagement led to the entrenchment of old stereotypes, matching the ‘intimate’ with
the ‘stranger’. The ‘intimate stranger’ is a powerful symbol for the dichotomies that
conversion collapses. It unpacks the world of liminality where binaries of ‘inside’
versus ‘outside’ and ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dissolve. Orientalism is still present but mutates
into a kind of Orientalism where geographies have collapsed: Bthere^ has become
Bhere^. The ‘intimate’ is by definition on the inside and the ‘stranger’ on the outside.
Conversion disrupts the imagined intimacy of the family. Where Islam suddenly
appears in the sitting room, rather than on TV, liberalism turns into bigotry. The idea
of borders collapses; the idea of the concrete and the abstract subsides; frontiers or
Bfront^-iers erode with home itself becoming the boundary and Islam no longer outside.
Conversion challenges people to accept the ambiguity inherent in life itself.
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